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In this essay, I will examine primary themes of Vecriture 
feminine, as they are represented by one of the most 
provocative and articulate of the new French feminists: Luce 
Irigaray. As I review key aspects of Irigaray's feminist vision 
and explore its attractiveness as an alternative to the 
phallogocentrism of our present discourse, I will raise questions 
about Irigaray's own ability to displace and overturn 
phallogocentric discourse through Vecriture feminine. Much of 
my criticism is focused on a father of the new French feminism, 
Jacques Lacan, whose veiled presence in Irigaray's writing 
threatens to distort and to co-opt her aims. 
As I entertain the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty as a 
constructive alternative to Lacan, I will suggest that Merleau-
Ponty's anthropology and ontology are not mired in the same 
phallocentric paradigms of sexuality and desire through 
which I see Irigaray betrayed by Lacan, despite Irigaray's 
efforts to evade seduction. I will give special attention to 
Merleau-Ponty's imagery of embodied dialogue, as well as to 
his notions of "field-being" and the foundational reciprocity of 
being in which persons are individualized. I will argue that a 
feminist criticism of sex-dualism must rest finally upon its 
criticism of the patriarchal forgetfulness of Being, a 
forgetfulness that neither Lacan nor his French feminist 
daughter confronts adequately, and upon the recovery of an 
anthropology and ontology open to Being. 
I. Meaning and Gender 
The new French feminism arises in the wake of the 
contesting of logocentrism by the post-structuralist tradition. 
The post-structuralists question key presumptions that have 
guided Western thought: the transparency of speech, the 
representation of things by words, and the possibility of self-
identical meaning. According to the post-structuralists, as soon 
as there is meaning, there is difference. Indeed, meaning is a 
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function of difference. The key metaphysical error of Western 
thought, on which the deconstructionists focus their attention, 
has been the assumption that Being is determined by being-
there, by presence. The tyranny of binary thought is the legacy 
of this metaphysical error: man/woman, culture/nature, 
good/evil are all subsumed in service to a metaphysics of 
identity and binary opposition.1 Deconstructionists, such as 
Derrida, have focused their indictment of Western 
metaphysics on the level of textual meaning and have 
attempted to show that the primacy of one meaning of a text is 
created by suppression of others. Lacan's contribution to this 
discussion, a contribution of inestimable significance to the new 
French feminists, is his consideration of a key question: is 
gender difference a paradigm for all conceptualizations of 
difference? When Lacan responds affirmatively and unites 
linguistic and psychoanalytic theories, ascribing the source of 
meaning to internalization of the Law-of-the-Father, he 
makes a move of central import both to the deconstructive 
tradition in general, and to feminist theorists in particular. 
When Lacan posits the creation of the Other, of difference at 
the heart of sexual and conceptual differentiation, he 
prescribes a set of stiff requirements for humans to function as 
social subjects. A linguistic register is the sole index of meaning. 
Moreover, because gender is the lived paradigm of the alterity 
of meaning, the price humans pay for entry into the realm of 
meaning and language is the submission of their sexuality to 
restrictions or laws of organization and exchange within a 
sexually differentiated group.2 
A story by Lacan in his essay. T h e Insistence of the Letter 
in the Unconscious," offers a gripping portrait of the role of 
gender in the creation of meaning. 
A train arrives at a station. A little boy and a little girl, brother and 
sister, are seated in a compartment face to face next to the 
window through which the buildings along the station platform 
can be seen passing as the train pulls to a stop. "Look," says the 
1 Claire Duchen, Feminism in France: From May '68 to Mitterand 
(New York: Methuen Books, 1986), p. 74. 
2Elissa D. Gelfand and Virginia Thorndike Holes, "A Topography of 
Difference," in French Feminist Criticism: Women, Language, 
Literature (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1985), pp. xxi-xxii. 
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brother, "we're at Ladies!"; "Idiot," replies his sister, "can't you see 
we're at Gentlemen!"3 
In this story, each child is able to see only one of the rest rooms. 
Their immediate situation depicts the metaphysics of 
representation: a word signifies a thing. Their confidence in 
their location, and in its meaning, marks the confidence of 
classic correspondence theories of truth. Yet the gendered roles 
of boy and girl in this story portend the subversion of this 
simple scene. Through the material given that they are seated 
on one side of the train compartment or the other, each child is 
placed in a structure and as such is unable to see that structure. 
The full import of the story hinges on the revelation of the 
play of the signifier in the story. First, a girl sees "Gentlemen" 
and a boy sees "Ladies." Irrevocable otherness is embedded in 
meaning. Second, while a material given, some would say a 
biological given, can be read in this story, this cannot be by 
attribution of maleness or femaleness in one-to-one 
correspondence to boy and girl. Rather, biological differences 
are of import only insofar as they insert the subject into the 
play of the signifier.4 According to Lacan, each child in the 
story, and each of us, so far as we live this story, must function 
in relation to an arbitrary and thus absolute boundary between 
the two realms of Ladies and Gentlemen, a boundary installed 
irrevocably upon our horizon through the advent of the 
signifier. Writes Lacan, "For these children. Ladies and 
Gentlemen will be henceforth two countries towards which 
each of their souls will strive on divergent wings, and between 
which a truce will be the more impossible since they are 
actually the same country and neither can compromise on its 
own superiority without detracting from the glory of the 
other." 5 
Lacan, who displays the special significance of revisionist 
psychoanalysis for the post-structuralist tradition and 
provides feminist theory with a most telling portrait of the 
parameters of patriarchal discourse, makes a point of crucial 
3Jacques Lacan, tcrits, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Co., Inc., 1977), p. 152. 
4 Jane Gallop, The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 10. 
5Lacan, tcrits, p. 152. 
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significance: the path to meaning lies not with biological or 
material pre-givens. Rather meaning is constituted by a pre-
existing signifying chain, that culture by which one is "held in 
train," and in which one finds oneself always, already, placed 
prior to any arrival at the station of life. "We are all sitting 
on one side of the compartment or the other: we are all subject 
to the blindness imposed by our seats in the compartment;"6 
there is no other way of being on the signifying chain/ train. 
Lacan's structural drama introduces two themes: Desire and 
Law. Desire, mirrored in the boy's "Look, we're at Ladies," is 
the index of identity, of sameness, of fusion with the Real. The 
boy's concrete attachment, interrupted by the girl's call for an 
alternative recognition, "Gentlemen," introduces the Law of the 
signifier into the conversation. Though the law is introduced 
by the girl in Lacan's story, the play of the signifier thus 
introduced is phallic. Awareness of difference and alienation, 
the possibility of substitutive self-representation through 
naming, is, in the broader Oedipus drama from which Lacan's 
train station story takes its impetus, the Father's name (nom) 
which says "no" (nori) to unitary meaning. The momentum of 
the story, linked with the word-of-the-Father at odds with 
the boy's image, posits the drive of Desire. A threat, not 
entirely veiled in the story, is that recognition will be sought 
at the other's expense. If necessary, the other will be 
annihilated in the struggle for validation of a unitary belief 
system. In an otherwise charming story, a difficult choice is 
offered: one learns difference, prerequisite for identity, by 
alienation into language and rules or one fails to evolve an 
identity adequate to social functioning at all.7 
Yet, for feminists such as Irigaray, behind any female's 
choice lurks a grimmer threat than that noted by Lacan. The 
train of the signifier marks the female as irreducibly other. 
There is no woman, except she who is excluded by the nature of 
words. At the same time, because it is she who ushers in the 
acceptance of Law, the male, a nonetheless-divided subject, is 
supported by the phallus, an abstract signifier that becomes 
concretized by the penis. In other words, as the language of 
Desire sets into play efforts by which boy and girl struggle to 
6Gallop, The Daughter's Seduction, pp. 11-12. 
7EUie Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of 
Psychoanalysis, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 273. 
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Desire sets into play efforts by which boy and girl struggle to 
reflectively outdo each other, the boy has an advantage: he 
sees an identity of the signifier and signified registered by his 
own body and the phallic signifier.8 The history of patriarchy 
is the legacy of this power-play. Irigaray's criticism of Lacan 
focuses upon his inattention to this move. Lacan's inattention, 
she thinks, short-circuits a thorough-going deconstruction of 
Freud. Differance-the deferral of masculine and feminine 
difference in the overturning of binary discourse—is subsumed 
under difference. Thus, in Lacanian theory woman is but a 
plane mirror who ensures the identity of man. She exists, not in 
the displacement of difference by differance, but only as a 
reflection of man himself.9 
II. Irigaray's Criticism of the Lacanian Occult 
Of course, Lacanians can defend Lacan against Irigaray. 
They may suggest that Irigaray mistakes the descriptive, 
analytic function of Lacan's work for a prescriptive function and 
that she reads him substantively, rather than structurally. 1 0 
Even so, I submit that Lacanians oversimplify Irigaray's intent. 
Her criticism of Lacan draws him from the shadows of his 
stories, of which the story I have summarized is but one, to 
focus on his role as their author. Irigaray cites a confusion of 
the substantive with the structural that cannot be ignored. 
This confusion, she rightly argues, is not hers, but Lacan's. 
Lacan is blinded by a phallocentric investment in his own chain 
of signifiers. Irigaray traces Lacan's error to his privileging of 
sight over other senses. Oculocentrism supports and unifies 
8Jacques Lacan, 'The Meaning of the Phallus," trans. Alan Sheridan in 
Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the tcole Freudienne eds. 
Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1985), p. 83. I note also Jane Gallop's Reading Lacan (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 133-156. Gallop argues 
persuasively for the identity of penis/phallus in Lacan's work. She 
locates hermeneutic potential in a pun. The unconscious castration 
complex functions as a knot ("Meaning of the Phallus," p. 75). In 
French, "knot" is "noeud," a crude term for "penis." 
^Hules, "A Topography of Difference," pp. xxvi-xxvii. 
1 0 Ragland-Sull ivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of 
Psychoanalysis, p. 273. 
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phallocentric theory. 1 1 For Lacan, Irigaray argues, the 
materiality of sexual difference is obliterated by the Idea of 
sex. The riddle of sexual difference occulted, phallocentric 
metaphysics triumphs in the face of blind disregard. 
Lacan's theory of the occult hinges upon the dream of 
symmetry. "Symmetry" means "to appropriate two things to 
like measure." When the feminine is judged by the standard of 
the masculine, the female is viewed as gap and lack. There is 
only absence in the male's sight of female genitalia: there is no 
symmetry, nothing of like measure. Irigaray writes. 
Within this logic, the predominance of the visual . . . is particularly 
foreign to female eroticism. Woman takes pleasure more from 
touching than from looking, and her entry into a dominant scopic 
economy signifies, again, her consignment to passivity: she is to 
be the beautiful object of contemplation. While her body finds 
itself thus eroticized . . . her sexual organ represents the horror of 
nothing to see. A defect in this systematics of representation and 
desire. A 'hole' in its scoptophilic lens. 1 2 
For Irigaray, the optical error centers on the absence of form in 
the female sexual organ. The oneness of form that privileges 
phallomorphism cannot see that female sexuality is not 
formed. "Woman has sex organs more or less everywhere. She 
finds pleasure almost anywhere . . . . the geography of her 
pleasure is far more diversified, more multiple in its 
differences, more complex, more subtle, than is commonly 
imagined—in an imaginary rather too narrowly focused on 
sameness."13 
Thus, Irigaray initiates her reader into the play of "this 
sex which is not one." Female eroticism may be invisible to the 
optical theorists. After all, Lacan asks, as did Freud, "What 
do women want?" Even so, female eroticism is lived as 
multiform. Woman's alternative economy is not reducible to 
identity. Hence, woman falls outside the Lacanian economy 
which posits the mirror play of identity-either one or none—as 
"Gallop, The Daughter's Seduction, p. 58. 
1 2 Luce Irigaray, 'This Sex Which Is Not One," in This Sex Which is 
Not One trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), p. 26. 
1 3Irigaray,"ThisSex,"p.28. 
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the founding dynamic of signification. Female eroticism is an 
economy of nearness, of nearness "so pronounced that it makes 
all discrimination of identity, and thus all forms of property, 
impossible." Woman's pleasure is "so near that she cannot 
have it, nor have herself."14 
Irigaray confounds her critics who decry the "literalism" in 
her reading of the fathers of psychoanalysis, for she 
understands clearly the primacy of the linguistic register. In an 
interview titled "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination 
of the Feminine," 1 5 Irigaray speaks succinctly of the 
deconstructive path taken by Vecriture feminine. Her 
psychoanalytic reading of the specular economy is an 
interpretation of the linguistic register. Irigaray issues a call 
to listen to procedures of repression, to the "structuration of 
language that shores up its representations, and to examine the 
"operation of the 'grammar' of each figure of discourse."1 6 But 
for Irigaray, this examination of grammar opens out on its 
silences, for only there is a discourse of the female sex 
operative. 
Irigaray's appeal to silence is an appeal to differance. 
Differance is experienced first in women's deliberate 
assumption of the feminine role, 1 7 which converts a form of 
subordination into an affirmation and begins a process of 
subversion. As an interim strategy for dealing with the realm 
of discourse in which the speaking subject is posited as 
masculine, the deliberate assumption of feminine style enables 
women to uncover the mechanism by which they are exploited. 
Moreover, like Alice's voyages of exploration in Through the 
Looking Glass, women's journey of retraversal unveils the 
feminine as elsewhere.1 8 
The "elsewhereness" of woman is necessarily linked with 
silence, for this is the "price" paid for withdrawal from the 
specular economy, from the phallic discourse that equates the 
silence of elsewhere with the absence of the phallus. Even so. 
"Irigaray, 'This Sex," p. 31. 
1 5Irigaray, 'The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the 
Feminine," in This Sex Which Is Not One, pp. 68-86. 
16lrigaray, "Power of Discourse," p. 75. 
17Irigaray, "Power of Discourse," p. 76. 
1 8Carolyn Burke, "irigaray Through the Looking Glass," in Feminist 
Studies 7, No. 2 (Summer, 1981), p. 296. 
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the elsewhere of feminine pleasure is lived, Irigaray writes, in 
"the crossing back through the mirror that subtends all 
speculation." Irigrary rightly acknowledges the dangers of her 
subversive discourse: 
For to speak of or about woman may always boil down to, or be 
understood as, a recuperation of the feminine within a logic that 
maintains it in repression, censorship, nonrecognition.19 
For this reason, she experiences feminine discourse as the 
offering of a new theory of woman, neither as subject nor as 
object, but rather as a "jamming of the theoretical machinery 
itself." 2 0 Vecriture feminine-tactile, fluid, explosive of form 
and idea—cannot be upheld as a thesis. At a space in the 
feminine, at that break in the jammed machinery of theory, is 
differance. 
Irigaray's efforts to liberate women from sexual 
objectification with a feminine jouissance that counters the 
phallic organization of sexuality are creative and inspiring. 
Her Vecriture feminine that presages women's shattering entry 
into history, as women's bodies are brought to speech from the 
silence of the repressed, offers poetic inspiration to women's 
emancipating goals. Even so, Irigaray's attempted subversion 
of the linguistic register, expressed by the decentered and 
displaced eroticism of the female body whose dual labia are 
emblematic of the sex which is not a sex, risks failure. True, 
Irigaray never claims usefulness for her theory. Its importance 
lies in its very nondirectiveness. Even so, Irigaray's "jamming" 
of the theoretical machinery of phallogocentrism brings to our 
ears the ever persistent clanking of the phallic discourse to 
which we still must attend. 
When Irigaray invokes the rhythms of the body, she only 
extends the sphere of existent speech—she does not invent a new 
one. 2* The terrain of what can be expressed is enlarged, but the 
structure of that terrain is not altered. The reversal of value 
undertaken by Vecriture feminine remains caught in the 
19Irigaray, "Power of Discourse," p. 78. 
^Irigaray, "Power of Discourse," p. 78. 
2 1 Beverley Brown and Parveen Adams, 'The Feminine Body and 
Feminist Politics," in m/f 3 (1979), p. 37. 
A SPECULAR DRAMA 75 
polarity of the specular economy. Irigaray's discourse does not 
depart from male-female opposition but participates in it. 
Lacan's voice, speaking through the machinery of phallic 
discourse, reminds us that omniscience before the signifying 
chain will always, already, escape us. Jane Gallop sums up the 
problem for all feminists: 
To date, the feminist efforts to understand and struggle against 
the cultural constructs of male-dominated society would have the 
subject consider as illusory the entire structure which makes the 
realms of Gentlemen and Ladies appear defined and absolute. . . . 
That effort would place the feminist as observer in some sort of 
floating position outside the structure, a position of omniscience. 
Such positioning ignores the subject's need to place himself 
within the signifying chain in order to be any place at all. 2 2 
Because the social order itself is internalized as difference and 
language, it is not an external order to be overthrown. Thus, the 
Lacanian critics of Irigaray do speak a truth: the phallic 
pattern of discourse she would subvert does not operate at the 
conscious level where we might master it by exposing it as an 
ideology. Rather, its roots in the unconscious, indeed its 
constitution of the unconscious, mean that we always come too 
late to the scene to know what we ought to believe. 2 3 Despite 
the brilliance of Irigaray's criticism, it falls prey to a form of 
binary thought. Irigaray's own blind spot, the blind spot 
endemic to the signifying chain on which we always, already 
find ourselves, misses the pattern of presence/absence, the 
vestiges of the occult, that cling to her own theory. 
If we are to challenge Lacan, it cannot be by absenting 
ourselves from his discourse. Only by staying with him and 
working through him will it be possible to exchange a 
problematic omniscience for a glimpse or intimation of 
differance that has eluded Vecrilure feminine. 
^Gallop, The Daughter's Seduction, p. 12. 
2 3 1 allude to a "perceptual faith" and embodied rootedness of 
perception. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the 
Invisible trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1968), pp. 28ff. 
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111. The Play of the Specular Image: Lacan and Merleau-
Ponty 
I turn to the work of Merleau-Ponty in search of tools for 
deconstructing Lacan. My attention turns to a paradigm that 
marks the theories of both: the specular image. Both Merleau-
Ponty and Lacan were fascinated by Walton's study of infants' 
reactions to their images in a mirror. That, for both, Wallon's 
research became a subject for their own writing is not 
particularly surprising. However, that mirror-theory, 
indebted to Wallon, became virtually the "organizing 
paradigm" for their reflections on ontology, is remarkable. 
Moreover, for both Lacan and Merleau-Ponty, the 
philosophical legacy of Saussure framed their reactions to and 
understanding of the process of human development recorded by 
Wallon. Both Merleau-Ponty and Lacan were led by Saussure's 
influence to place their work on the specular theory within the 
context of a linguistic register, or a history of discourse. In 
comparing Merleau-Ponty's and Lacan's work, I hope to glimpse 
the displacement of phallogocentric discourse that might 
presage differance. 
For both Merleau-Ponty and Lacan, the specular image 
serves as a founding metaphor for philosophical anthropology. 
Central to the anthropologies of both Merleau-Ponty and Lacan 
is the claim that perception of others is made comprehensible 
only if one supposes that psychogenesis begins in a state in 
which "the child is unaware of him/herself and the other as 
different beings." 2 4 This claim is founded upon a careful 
examination of a break in the process of human identity-
creation, marked in an infant's stages of development at six 
months, between pre-specular and specular phases. In the pre-
specular world, there is no I-Other differentiation. Beginning 
observations of otherness focus not upon others, but upon part-
others: feet, mouth, hands. Extroceptic perception is missing 
and the absence or presence of mother or father is impressed 
polymorphously upon an infant, as a sense of incompleteness. 
At this precommunicative stage, which could be called one of 
pre-recognition, an "undifferentiated group life" excludes ego-
2 4Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," The 
Primacy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964), p. 119. 
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awareness . 2 5 The transition from undifferentiated life to 
difference functions to close one's body in upon itself, to disclose 
insularity of self and, correlalively, that of others. 
At six months the specular phase beings. The stage is set 
for a crucial weaving of part into whole: the infant, looking in 
the mirror, smiles at his parent.2 6 At this moment, the parent 
speaks to the child. The child appears surprised and turns 
towards the voice. What knowledge is carried in this surprise? 
At this first stage in the specular drama, the parent's image 
takes on an existence separate from, though inferior to, the 
parent. 2 7 Gradually, the child is able to distinguish, regularly 
and systematically, the image of the parent he sees in the 
mirror from his actual parent. The child's own awareness of his 
specular image comes later. At first, the child seems to see his 
specular image as a sort of double: he may kiss his image very 
ceremoniously or appear to play with it. But, as the child 
approaches twelve through eighteen months in age, he begins 
to deprive the specular image of its quasi-reality. The child 
does seem fascinated by the image, but the strongly felt reality 
of the image ceases to be a source of confusion: by means of the 
image in the mirror the child becomes capable of assuming the 
role of spectator of himself. Acquiring the specular image as 
specular image, the child passes from introceptive me to visual 
me, from the introceptive me to the specular I . 2 8 
Merleau-Ponty comments expressly on his agreement with 
Lacan about the significance of this "rite" of passage. He 
affirms Lacan's accurate gauging of the importance of this 
transitional moment in the life of the child. At the moment 
that the image of oneself makes possible, for the first time, a 
knowledge of self, one is alienated. Merleau-Ponty writes of 
this lesson which is of such decisive importance to human 
development: 
I am no longer what I felt myself, immediately, to be; I am that 
image of myself that is offered by the mirror 1 am 'captured. 
^Merleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations wih Others," p. 119. 
2 6 For both Lacan and Merleau-Ponty, the child is a "he." Interestingly, 
Merleau-Ponty maintains the Father of Wallon's research; Lacan 
substitutes a Mother in the role of specular parent. 
^Merleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations with Others," p. 129. 
^Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," p. 136. 
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For both Merleau-Ponty and Lacan, specular theory identifies 
the working of alienation that is inevitable in the human 
species. Specular theory marks the moment in which a conflict 
between the me felt by myself and the me seen by myself or by 
others is initiated. For both, acquisition of the specular image 
bears not so much on relations of understanding—an 
epistemological claim—as upon relations of being—an 
ontological claim. With grim observations that recall the 
Hegelian master/slave dialectic, Merleau-Ponty and Lacan 
each note that this alienation of the immediate me, its 
'confiscation' for the benefit of the me that is visible in the 
mirror, already outlines what will be the confiscation of the 
subject by the others who look at me. 3 0 
Having shared stories to this point, Lacan and Merleau-
Ponty diverge from each other as their analysis of the specular 
process continues. The importance of this divergence for my 
feminist project cannot be underestimated. Lacan, I will argue, 
moves on in forgetfulness of Being, to embrace phallogocentric 
discourse. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty's continued reflections 
bear intimations of an alternative discourse, one open to the 
recovery of an anthropology and ontology open to Being and to 
differance. 
A. Lacan: Specular Tyranny 
For Lacan, the central figure in the specular drama is the 
mother. Syncretism of the child with his mother marks the 
absence of psychic separation from (M)other,31 and a resulting 
incapacity to submit to a reality principle: the Law of name-
of-the-Father. During the mirror stage, the infant wants to 
possess the (M)other because she provides an object of constancy 
and continuity that does not reside within. The lesson of the 
specular process is that this ideal of unity with (M)other is an 
29Merleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations with Others," p. 136. 
^Merleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations with Others," p. 137. 
3 1 Ragland-Sul l ivan , Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of 
Psychoanalysis, pp. 26-29. 
caught up' by my spacial i m a g e . . . . In this sense I am torn from 
myself, and the image in the mirror prepares me for another still 
more serious alienation, which will be the alienation by others. 2 9 
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illusion. The child experiences the full ambiguity of human 
behavior: a nonpeaceful coexistence with the specular mot 
through which self-awareness is given only as one is both 
divided from the (M)other and is forced to verify oneself 
through others. As the mirror stage ends, (M)other is repressed 
as the primordial pivot of Desire. She acts a mediator of Law, 
as one who introduces naming, language, through which 
alienation is both structured and recognized. The phallic 
signifier appears as a third term between mother and child, 
announcing the passage from nature to culture. The child's 
separation from the mother is traumatic castration. Yet even as 
the phallus marks difference/separation, it grants the 
capacity for speech: a capacity to symbolize absence which is 
the necessary mechanism for the survival of the pain of 
individuation.3 2 
According to Lacan, the mirror drama is reenacted 
throughout life as all humans seek and demand recognition 
from the Other. Gripped by desire of/for/by the Other(A), 
humans are driven to recreate psychic feelings of wholeness, 
jouissance, that characterize the prespecular stage of humans. 
Even so, the space between the moi—that nonverbal agent of 
specularity who experiences others as gaze even as it takes 
everything in with its own gaze—and the Other(A) widens, 3 3 
leading Lacan to describe Desire as the derive de la jouissance. 
Derive, a word used for the wake left by a boat in the water, 
gives way to an image of humans who, cut loose from their 
moorings and adrift in the world, can trace the experience of 
wholeness only to a wake. Rocked in the wake of Desire, they 
never recoup that sense of unity that precedes their life-
journeys across the water.34 
Instead, introduced and maintained by language, a phallic 
injunction to separation pushes the child into the adult world in 
which Desire is displaced. In wanting to be the Other, human 
infants are subjugated by the Other's Desire, from which they 
must later find distance through displacements, if 
individuation is to be achieved. Adult psychic "freedom," 
measured in the work of psychoanalysis, lies in pinpointing 
this alien Desire. At best only partial recognition is possible. 
32Ragland-Sullivan, pp. 55-56. 
^Ragland-Sullivan, pp. 76-77. 
^Ragland-Sullivan, p. 75. 
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Any specular relation is one of narcissistic exclusion. The 
relation between analyst and analysand is no exception: two 
moi's try to objectify each other. 3 5 The war of the moi's, as a 
struggle between humans for omnipotence, puts humanity at 
risk. Yet, for Lacan, the lesson of psychoanalysis is that the 
moi's will for self survival, which consumes all in the drive for 
unity or self-destructs under the tyranny of the Other's gaze, is 
checked, and in a life-sustaining manner, by the Name-of-the-
Father which neutralizes the Master and Slave in all of us. "In 
this sense, the phallic superego saves the individual from 
psychosis, and the society from genocide, while also imposing 
tyranny and alienation on being."3 6 
The name-of-the-Father is introduced as a saving grace. 
Even as Lacan identifies the entry of the Father in terms of an 
Oedipal drama and talks of the separation from unity with 
(M)other as castration, for Lacan the verbal capacity to 
symbolize absence, attributed to the Father's "nom and non" 
becomes the key intentional mechanism for surviving the 
trauma of unending otherness. 
The war of the moi's is, finally, a gendered war. Without 
the male, the human female, identified in the signifying chain 
as lack, risks psychosis or ontological death. In partnering 
with man she attains value: she enjoys status within the social 
discourse that founds her identity against dissolution. Without 
the female, the human male threatens the destruction of others 
in his will to power. Man's desire for woman means that she 
functions as supplement to his own Imagined lack. Man makes 
love to complete himself. Woman is the catalyst in his psychic 
drama. Man's Imaginary fantasy guards the world against the 
victory of the powers of a death-driven ontology.37 
Lacan's specular theory is one of our more exact portraits of 
patriarchy. That for Lacan the specular relation founds human 
identity, that for Lacan the specular relation always entails 
narcissistic exclusion, marks the Lacanian study of human 
identity as a most memorable study of phallogocentrism. The 
creation of masculine identity, as mirrored, is self-creation, to 
the exclusion of otherness. Differance eludes man. 
^Ragland-Sullivan, p. 84. 
^Ragland-Sullivan, p. 58. 
^Ragland-Sullivan, p. 292-293. 
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B. A Gestural Dialogue: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology 
Merleau-Ponty's divergence from Lacan in his 
interpretation of the process of human development bears 
intimations of an alternative discourse, which, to the extent 
that feminism can partake of it, opens onto a recovery of non-
phallogocentric Being and of differance. He emphasizes, as 
Lacan does not, the continuation of a corporeal condition, traced 
to the mirror stage, that leads us to feel, in the presence of a 
mirror, that we are finding something of ourselves.3 8 The lesson 
of the specular theory is not, for Merleau-Ponty, primarily 
visual, but rather tactual: children actually perceive 
themselves as being in two distinct places. 3 9 Ubiquity of self 
promises the presence of others. 
Merleau-Ponty dissents also from Wallon, for whom 
instruction in the specular teaches the child, through a 
synthesis of intellection, that the image he sees is not him. 
Merleau-Ponty, in contrast, sees the specular instruction less in 
terms of self and more in terms of others: the mirror shows the 
child what others see of him. He asks that we "consider the 
relation with others not only as one of the contents of our 
experience but as an actual structure in its own right. 4 0 While 
Wallon focuses on intellection, partakes of the philosophy of 
symmetry, and appears preoccupied with the problem of 
identity, Merleau-Ponty bypasses him to examine the 
ontological import of the specular instruction on other terms. 
For Merleau-Ponty, since image-reflection is unstable, the 
operations that constitute it "involve not only the intelligence 
proper, but, rather, all the individual's relations with 
others." 4 1 The ubiquity of the body, both present in the mirror 
and present where felt tactually, marks as fundamental a 
living relation with others. As he focuses on this relational 
structure, Merleau-Ponty writes that "this magic belief, which 
at first gives the specular image the value not of a simple 
reflection . . . but rather of a double of onesel f . . . re-forms itself 
in the emotional makeup of the adult."4 2 For him, the lesson of 
^Merleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations with Others/' p. 138. 
39Mcrleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations with Others," p. 139. 
40Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," p. 140. 
41Merleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations with Others," p. 140. 
42Merleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations with Others," p. 138. 
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the specular image truly has ontological measure, and in a 
fundamentally embodied manner. A mutuality of recognition is 
presaged, or prefigured, in the early specular drama. 
Merleau-Ponty goes on to examine more closely the syncretic 
sociability, or field-being, that he thinks is not outrun by the 
child as it develops a sense of individual identity. Wallon's 
studies of jealousy and sympathy in the child offer crucial 
insight into Merleau-Ponty's theory of syncretic sociability. 
Moreover, because I believe that Wallon's study of jealousy 
corresponds with Lacan's typology of desire, just as Wallon's 
study of sympathy corresponds with Merleau-Ponty's typology 
of love, comparison of Merleau-Ponty and Lacan, via Wallon 
and in light of their receptive approaches to syncretic 
sociability, offers constructive possibilities for the thesis I 
have been elaborating in this essay. 
Jealousy, for a child, manifests the failure of a child to 
isolate or affirm his own life in distinction from that of 
another. Having nothing of his own, the jealous child defines 
himself "entirely in relation to others and by the lack of what 
others have." 4 3 Citing an example of jealousy in the adult, 
Merleau-Ponty notes that a man's rivalry with another man for 
the attention of a woman-a classic drama of jealousy—shows 
the jealous man to be one who lives not only by his own 
experiences, but also in assuming the life of the other. The 
jealous man knows not how to act, except as a spectator 
possessed by the action of the rival. This leads Merleau-Ponty 
to conclude that, in jealousy, there is always an element of 
homosexuality.44 
What then of sympathy? Just as jealousy is primarily a 
specular phenomenon, sympathy is primarily postural. 
Sympathy appears in the child on the foundation of mimesis. 
It is part of the attitudinal posture whereby I assume the 
gestures, conducts, and ways of doing things of those whom I 
confront. Wallon speaks of a kind of "postural impregnation" 
that founds the gestures of imitation. Sympathy emerges from 
this: "I live in the facial expressions of the other, as I feel him 
living in mine. It is a manifestation of what we have called, in 
other terms, the system 'me-and-other.'"45 
^Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," p. 143. 
^Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," p. 144. 
^Merleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations with Others," p. 146. 
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For both Merleau-Ponty and Lacan, the crisis that ushers in 
the post-specular age and presages human maturation to 
adulthood marks the end of syncretic sociability: me-and-
other fusion. What are the legacies of the twin dramas of 
jealousy and sympathy in adulthood? In light of my thesis, 
jealousy is sustained in adult life as paradigmatic behavior 
under the conditions of patriarchy or under the rule of a 
phallic, specular economy criticized by Irigaray. As such, 
jealousy marks phallogocentric discourse as discourse that 
distorts possibilities for a postural, embodied discourse. 
Possessed by a dream of symmetry, those in the grip of jealousy 
squander dialogical possibilities, are blind to differance, and 
err as they attempt to ascribe all meaning either to "male-
being" or to "female-being." Analyses indebted to Merleau-
Ponty suggest another scenario: we may ascribe jealousy to a 
specular economy in which a battle of moi's besets field-being, 
in forgetfulness of ontological potential. 
If jealousy, seen in the child Wallon studies, is not outrun by 
the adult but resurfaces as part of a Lacanian specular tyranny 
of desire in adult life, what then of sympathy? Sympathy is 
extended also to the adult life. Significantly, it is Merleau-
Ponty and not Lacan who appropriates sympathy as a 
paradigmatic possibility for adult life. For Merleau-Ponty, 
the continuation of the child's postural impregnation with the 
other in sympathy with that other is found again in the adult 
experience of love. 
At this point, I catch a glimpse of an alternative to the 
oculocentric ontology criticized by Irigaray. Yet, even as I do, 
the voice of Lacan persists, raising suspicions in my mind. Is not 
sympathy, in the adult human, pathological? Does not 
sympathy fold under the consuming gaze of the other, for whom 
even sympathy is translated, in the adult, into the battle of 
two moi's who ever try to objectify each other? Is not 
selflessness, in the adult, a prescription for death of self? Is not 
Lacan's scenario, which subsumes all to the control of the Law, 
the only scenario for adult life with which we can live? 
The answer to all of these questions is "no," not the "no" of 
the Father's law, but the "no" of the risk-taker who affirms 
more in her love than she knows. The risk is not the same as 
that recognized by Lacan: the risk of entrapment by the other. 
Although Merleau-Ponty does recognize the risk of a kind of 
love that ensnares or traps others because it never has enough 
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proofs, for Merleau-Ponty another form of risk is possible for 
adult love. Adult love, for Merleau-Ponty, can affirm the 
promise of syncretic sociability, non-specularly: in the 
generosity of praxis. 4 6 For Merleau-Ponty, the life-journey 
reaches toward fullness, not as humans are rocked in the 
desolate wake of desire, not as humans look backward toward 
fusion with a mother-shore whose safe banks they can never 
again attain, but in forward-moving praxis. 
Central to Merleau-Ponty's vision is the foundational 
reciprocity of Being that is proved as it is lived out as real 
possibility in adult human lives. The relevance of his vision 
for feminism cannot be underestimated. Like Irigaray, 
Merleau-Ponty founds his ontology in embodied being. Unlike 
her, Merleau-Ponty escapes the vestiges of the economy of the 
occult. Where the binary opposition of masculine/feminine 
powered by the remnants of the patriarchal omniscient vision 
has persisted in Irigaray's work, Merleau-Ponty's 
anthropology resists naming the reciprocity of being that 
founds human discourse in terms of man-being and woman-being. 
Rather, for Merleau-Ponty, field-being is differentiated in a 
process of being-in-coexistence-with-another.47 His anthro-
pology is not closed in upon the individual. Instead, it suggests 
the possibility of a world defined in terms of fundamentally 
intersubjective structures. The world arises as a response to the 
touch and gesture of another. The focus is not upon a dual 
reality of two existent individuals whose mutual recognition 
the philosopher of the specular strives to effect, but upon the 
reciprocity of being/Being in which persons are 
i n d i v i d u a l i z e d . 4 8 In this encounter there is reciprocal 
humanization: a dialogue of field-being. Merleau-Ponty's 
vision intimates differance: because dialogue is missed if man 
and woman are approached as individual monologues of being, 
for Merleau-Ponty woman and man as such do not exist. Who 
46Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others," p. 155. 
47Merleau-Ponty, 'The Child's Relations with Others," p. 140 See also 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Body in Its Sexual Being," in 
Phenomenology of Perception trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 154-174. 
4 8Abel Jeanniere, The Anthropology of Sex trans. Julie Kernan (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 128. 
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they are is created and carried in the praxis of embodied 
conversation. 
For feminist theory, the transcendent possibilities of 
encounter Merleau-Ponty cites hold much promise. The 
fundamental expressivity of the body displays a structural 
potential for a communion that may never be exhausted. The 
passage from syncretic sociability of childhood to adulthood, 
as a passage from implicit to explicit sociability, is itself the 
journey of Being. The promotion of being to expression and the 
articulation of human presence in the reciprocity of mutual 
recognition are at once the promotion of Being to expression. 
